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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(1) Nature of the Case: 
Western Home Transport, Inc., (hereinafter "Appellant") appeals the Industrial 
Commission's (hereinafter "Commission") Decision and Order that the remuneration 
Appellant paid to its drivers who transported mobile homes for Appellant's customers 
was wages for services performed in covered employment for Idaho unemployment 
insurance purposes. 
(2) Course of the Proceedings Below: 
The Idaho Department of Labor (hereinafter "Department") issued a 
redetermination on September 23, 2011, concluding that remuneration paid by Appellant 
to its interstate transport drivers for work performed from January 1, 2008 through 
December 31, 2010 was wages for services performed in covered employment. Exhibit 
3. Appellant filed a timely appeal on October 5, 2011. Exhibit 4. On May 16, 2012, the 
Department's Appeals Examiner held a hearing where all parties were represented by 
legal counsel. Exhibit 1. On June 4, 2012, the Department's Appeals Examiner issued a 
decision affirming the Department's redetermination. R. pp. 1-12. 
On June 18, 2012, Appellant filed a timely appeal of the decision to the 
Commission. R. pp. 13-17. After a de nova review of the record, the Commission issued 
its Decision and Order on October 2, 2012, affirming the Appeals Examiner's decision. 
R. pp. 22-37. Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal to this Court on November 1, 
2012. R. pp. 38-40. 
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(3) Statement of Facts: 
Appellant is an Idaho corporation engaged in the business of providing the 
interstate transport of manufactured homes and modular buildings. Tr. p. 11, L. 25; p. 12, 
L. 1; p. 209, Ll. 10-11. In order to engage in interstate transport, a business must first 
obtain a Motor Canier (MC) number issued by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration of the U.S. Department of Transportation and a U.S. Depm1ment of 
Transp011ation (DOT) number also issued by the United States Depai1ment of 
Transportation. Tr. p. 13, LL 18-25; p. 14, LL 5-12. 
Appellant's interstate transport drivers owned their trucks and leased them to 
Appellant. Tr. p. 28, LI. l-3. As a result of the lease agreements, Appellant acquired the 
exclusive possession, control and use of the trucks. Exhibit 7; Tr. p. 21, LI. 15-19; p. 22, 
Ll. 7-8; p. 74, LI. 3-5; p. 135, LL 24-25; p. 136, L. l; p. 245, LI. 18-22; p. 275, LI. 6-25; 
P. 276, LL 1-6. Appellant did not operate any trucks under its MC/DOT authority that 
were not leased from Appellant's drivers. Tr. p. 28, LL 1-3; p. 214, LL 18-23: p. 218, Ll. 
23-25; p. 259, LL 17-22. The lease agreements drafted by Appellant were for a tenn of 
thiity days and then continued month to month until terminated at will by either party. 
Exhibit 7. 
Appellant covered all of its interstate transport drivers with Appellant's MC/DOT 
authority. Tr. p. 87, LI. 14-22; p. 193, Ll. 9-19; p. 259. LL 14-16. As a result, Appellant 
required its drivers to place decals on the sides of its leased trucks signifying to 
authorities that the trucks were being operated under Appellant's MC/DOT authority. Tr. 
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p. 253, LL 21-25: p. 254, LL 1-7. Appellant identified each truck by a fleet number it 
assigned. Tr. p. 91, LL 9-21. The insurance identification cards only identified Appellant 
as the insured. Exhibit I: Tr. p. 166. LL 24-25; p. 167, L. 1. The required insurance 
identified each truck by the unit number assigned by Appellant. Tr. p. 16 7, LL 4-13. 
Appellant's drivers could not drive the trucks for anyone else while the trncks were 
leased to Appellant and displayed Appellant's MC/DOT decals. Tr. p. 203, LL 6-25; p. 
204, LL 1-19. Appellant required its drivers to maintain daily contact and to obtain 
Appellant's wTitten authorization before transporting any commodity. Exhibit 7; Tr. p. 
251, LL 10-13; p. 260, Ll. 18-25. 
Appellant acknowledged that having MC/DOT authority over the interstate 
operation of the leased trucks gave it the inherent right to direct and control the details of 
the work Tr. p. 245, LL 11-14. Appellant's interstate transport drivers could not assign 
someone else to make the transport. Tr. p. 263, LI. 6-8 
Appellant's drivers obtained their own commercial driver's license and covered 
their own expenses for medical exams and drug tests. Tr. p. 73, LL 17-19; p. 173, Ll. 13-
14. They also maintained and repaired their trucks. Tr. p. 73, LI. 6-16; p. l LL 19-25; 
p. 173, LL 1-7. Because Appellant was legally responsible for the safety of the trucks, 
Appellant required its drivers to attend safety meetings. Tr. p. 31, LL 3-5; p. 265, LL 23-
25; p. 266, Ll. 1-2. Appellant, and not its interstate transport drivers, would be cited for 
any DOT safety violations. Tr. p. 259, LL 2-4; p. 267, LI. 23-25. Appellant could lose its 
MC/DOT authority based on the conduct of its drivers. Tr. p. 266, Ll. 3-5. Because 
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Appellant's MC/DOT authority and liability were at stake if Appellanf s drivers did not 
properly maintain their trucks, drivers would fired if their trucks were not properly 
maintained. Tr. p. 30. LL 20-25; p. 31, LI. I 
Appellant did not withhold taxes or provide benefits for its drivers. Tr. p. 32, LI. 
11-22. Appellant paid its drivers a percentage of each load. Tr. p. LL 21-25. 
Appellant loaded the driver's payment onto a comdata card set up by Appellant. Tr. p. 
85, Ll. 14-21; p. 189, LL 9-25. Appellant provided advances to its drivers to allow them 
to pay for fuel costs and road taxes. Exhibit Tr. p. 22. Ll. 1-4; p. 32, Ll. 17-20: p. 261, 
LI. 9-18; p. 269, LL 16-1 7. Without the advances. Appellant's drivers could not afford to 
front the funds necessary to cover them. Tr. p. 32, LI. 11-20. Appellant also reimbursed 
the drivers for fuel surcharge costs. Tr. p. 182, LI. 4-6; p. 187, LL 10. Appellant 
audited and recorded fuel purchased by its drivers and filed International Fuel Tax 
Agreement (IFTA) repo1is with the State Tax Commission. Tr. p. 261, Ll. 9-18. 
Appellant obtained all the necessary insurance Appellant's name, writing the check to 
the insurance company and then passing the cost onto its drivers. Exhibit Tr. p. 28, LI. 
9-21; p. 89, Ll. 10-25; p. 90, Ll. 1-2: p. 94, LL 23-25: p. 95, Ll. 1-4; p. I LI. 2-11; p. 
224, LI. 1-13; p. LL 8-11. Appellant required its drivers to maintain an escrow 
account with a minimum balance of $300 to cover insurance premiums. Exhibit 7. 
Appellant reimbursed the drivers the cost of hiring a pilot car when the driver turned in 
the freight bill. Tr. p. 76, Ll. 4-9; p. 186, LI. 1 ; p. 187, Ll. 1-15. Appellant reviewed 
the driving record of each driver before it ordered drivers' licenses. Tr. p. LI. 7-14. 
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Appellant hauled oversized loads where special trip pennits and routes of travel 
were required. Tr. p. 237, LI. 14-18. The State ofidaho required Appellant to verify its 
MC/DOT authority and insurance coverage in order to obtain a permit. Tr. p. 271, LL 5-
6. Appellant paid for the trip pennits and billed their cost directly to Appellant's 
customers. Tr. p. 270, LL 19-23, Appellant made all arrangements for the loads and 
provided all the transport jobs to its drivers. Tr. p. 259, LL 5-8. Appellant's name was 
on all the paperwork at the ports of entry, on freight bills and on bills of lading. Tr. p. 
259, LL 9-16. Appellant created the price quotes for its transport services. Tr. p. 230, LI. 
23-25; p. 231, LL 1-9. Appellant was required to complete all bills of lading and freight 
billings before its driver could transport under Appellants MC/DOT authority. Tr. p. 259, 
LI. 5-15; p. 267, LL 2-12. Appellant had the exclusive possession, control and use of the 
equipment preventing its drivers from going "willy nilly out and haul[ing] someone else's 
product without our [Appellant's] freight bill and our papers ... " Exhibit 7; Tr. p. 275, 
Ll. 11-25; p. 276, Ll. 1-6. Appellant classified all drivers as independent contractors and 
the Department reclassified them as employees. Exhibit 3. Tr. p. 219, LL 1-8. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
L 
Should the Court follow the principle of stare decisis and apply controlling 
precedent that truck drivers operating solely under another's federal motor carrier and 
U.S. Department of Transportation authority were not, and legally could not be, 
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independently established in their o\vn interstate transportation business for purposes of 
Idaho's Employment Security Law? 
II. 
Is there substantial and competent evidence in the record to support the Industrial 
Commission's findings and conclusions that the drivers were as a matter of law 
employees and not independent contractors? 
III. 
Should attorney fees and costs be awarded to the Department in an appeal from an 
administrative proceeding? 
ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
In proceedings involving tax liability under the Employment Security Law, the 
provisions of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho Code, 
regarding contested cases and judicial review of contested cases, are not applicable. 
Idaho Code§ 72-1361. 
In appeals from decisions of the Industrial Commission, the Court's review is 
limited to questions of law. Idaho Constitution, Article V, § 9; Pimley v. Best Values, 
Inc., 132 Idaho 432, 434, 974 P2d 78, 80 (1999). This Court does not reweigh the 
evidence or consider \Vhether it would have reached a different conclusion. Ginther v. 
Boise Cascade Corporation, 150 Idaho 143, 147, 244 P.3d 1229, 1233 (2010). While 
conflicting evidence may exist in the record, the Court will not disturb the Commission's 
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factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. The factual findings of the 
Commission will be upheld provided they are supported by substantial and competent 
evidence. Uhl v. Ballard A1edical Products, Inc., 138 Idaho 653, 657, 67 P.3d 1265, 
1269 (2003). "Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable 
mind might accept to support a conclusion." Id. "Substantial evidence is more than a 
scintilla of proof, but less than a preponderance." Painter v. Potlach Corporation, 138 
Idaho 309, 312, 63 P.2d 435, 438 (2003), citing Zapata v. JR. Simplot Co., 132 Idaho 513, 
515, 975 P.2d 1178, 1180 (1999). In reviewing a decision of the Commission, the Court 
views all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed 
before the Commission. Ginther v. Boise Cascade Corporation, 150 Idaho at 147, 244 
P.3d at 1233. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The principal of stare decisis requires controlling precedent be followed 
that truck drivers operating solely under another's federal motor carrier 
and U.S. Department of Transportation authoritv were not, and legally 
could not be, independently established in their own interstate 
transportation business for purposes of Idaho's Employment Security 
Law. 
There is simply no new principal of law that requires this Court to overturn its 
prior decision in Giltner, Inc. v. Idaho Department of Commerce and Labor, 145 Idaho 
415, 179 P. 3d 1071 (2008). This Court has repeatedly held that controlling precedent 
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will not be ovenuled "unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be 
unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate the plain, obvious 
principles of law and remedy a continued injustice." State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 
660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 
77, 803 P2d 978, 983 (1990). See also, State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1010, 842 P.2d 
660, 680 (1992), Reyes v. Kit Mfg. Co., 131 Idaho 239, 240, 953 P.2d 989, 990 (1998) 
and State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 127 P.3d 133 (2005). 
The record in this case establishes that Appellant's interstate transportation 
drivers drove under Appellant's MC/DOT authority. TL p. 87, LL 14-22; p. 193, LL 9-
19: p. 259, LL 14-16. Federal MC authority is the legal operating authority that allows 
the transportation of non-exempt goods across state lines. Tr. p. 13, LL 18-25. An 
interstate transportation company's federal DOT number is a unique identifier used for 
collecting and monitoring a company's safety information. Tr. p. 14, Ll. 1-12. Both the 
MC authority and the DOT number are issued by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration. Tr. p. 13, LL 16-25. 
By federal law, a business cannot operate as a motor carrier without registering 
with the U.S. Secretary of Transportation. See 49 U.S.C. § 13901. The Secretary's 
registration requires motor carriers to comply with federal statutes and regulations 
governing the interstate transportation of goods and imposes minimum financial 
responsibility on motor carriers for personal or property damage caused by a motor 
carrier's negligent operation, maintenance or use of the motor carrier's vehicles. See 49 
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U.S.C. § 13902(a)(l ). As a registered motor carrier vvith MC/DOT authority, Appellant 
acknowledged that it could lose its authority to operate an interstate transportation 
business should Appellant's drivers operating under its MC/DOT authority fail to comply 
with the requirements of the federal motor carrier law and regulations. TL p. 30, LL 20-
25; p. 31, LL 1-5: p. 259, LL 2-4; p. 265, LL 23-25; p. 266, LL 1-5; p. 267, LI. 23-25. 
The appellant in Giltner was an interstate transportation company that engaged 
owner/operator drivers who were paid a percentage of each load. Giltner, 145 Idaho at 
418, 179 P. 3d at 1074. Each owner/operator driver entered into a "Contractor 
Operating/Lease Agreement" and an "Equipment Lease Agreement" with Giltner. 
Giltner, 145 Idaho at 418, 179 P. 3d at 1074. In analyzing the second "independently 
established" prong of the Department's statutory independent contractor test, this Court 
noted that Giltner's owner/operator drivers were dependent on Giltner's DOT authority to 
haul goods interstate and had no independent authority to operate without Giltner's DOT 
authority. Idaho Code§ 72-1316(4)(b) and Giltner, 145 Idaho at 420, 179 P. 3d at 1076. 
Therefore, this Court held, as a matter oflaw, that Giltner's owner/operator drivers could 
not be engaged in their own independently established interstate transportation business 
for purposes ofidaho's Employment Security Law. Giltner, 145 Idaho at 420, 179 P. 3d 
at 1076. 
In this case, Appellant is also a transportation company providing the interstate 
transportation of manufactured homes and modular buildings. Tr. p. 11, L. 25; p. 12, L. 
1; p. 209, LL 10-11. Appellant engaged drivers and paid them a percentage of the income 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
9 
it received from the loads they delivered. Tr. p. 28, LI. 1-3. Appellant did not have any 
trucks of its own and leased the trucks it operated from its interstate transportation 
drivers. Tr. p. 28, LL 1-6; p. 214, LL 18-23; p. 218, LL 23-25; p. 219, LI. 1-8; p. 259, LI. 
J 7-22. Appellant entered into lease agreements it drafted with its drivers giving 
Appellant the exclusive possession, control and use of each vehicle. Exhibit 7; Tr. p. 2 L 
LI. 15-19; p. 22, LL 7-8; p. 74, LI. 3-5: p. 135, LL 24-25; p. 136, L. 1; p. 245, LI. 18-22; 
p. 275, LL 6-25; p. 276, Ll 1-6. Appellant's drivers were required to drive a truck 
identified with Appellant's MC/DOT authority. Exhibit 29; Tr. p. 13, LL 16-25; p. 14, 
LL 5-12; p. 18, LI. 3-7; p. 34, LL 21-23; p. 259, LL 14-16. Appellant's drivers were 
dependent on Appellant's MC/DOT authority to haul goods interstate. Appellant 
provided all the services that an independent contractor would otherwise provide like 
bills of lading, trip permits, paperwork, fuel tax filings, insurance, accounting, advances 
to cover upfront costs of fuel and its MC/DOT authority. Appellant's interstate 
transportation drivers testified that they did not have their own MC/DOT authority. Tr. p. 
87, LL 14-22; p. 193, LL 14-25; p. 194, LL 1-4. Appellant's witness, Michael Byington 
acknowledged that he was not independent. He testified: 
I have to get my own authority and I don't know how to do that and if I 
go totally independent I can't even afford to do that and I don't know -
and I don't know all the contacts and everything and -- you know. 
Because I will go to some places that I don't even know they existed or 
whatever. 
Tr. p. 193, LL 24-25; p. 194, LL 1-4. Without their own MC/DOT authority, Appellant's 
interstate transportation drivers were not, and legally could not have been, independently 
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established in their own interstate transportation business. 
Courts in various states have also found owner/operator drivers to be covered 
employees for unemployment insurance purposes under facts similar to those in this case. 
In Byrne Trucking Inc. v. Employment Division, 32 Or. App. 229, 574 P.2d 664, ajf'd, 
284 Or. 443, 587 P.2d 473 (1978), Byrne engaged in interstate commerce, procured the 
freight, collected the charges from shippers and its owner/operators paid all expenses, 
chose their own routes, and controlled the method of loading. Byrne leased trucks from 
its drivers. Bryne required its drivers to display its signage on their trucks and the trucks 
were driven exclusively for Byrne. As in this case, Bryne's drivers had no business they 
could sell apart from the value of the trucks. In Western Ports Transportation, Inc. v. 
Employment Security Department, 10 Wash. App. 440, 41 P .3d 5 l 0 (2002), the court also 
found that the owner/operators were employees under circumstances similar to Byrne. 
The Supreme Court of New York in Claim ofShort, 233 A.D. 2d 676, 649 N.Y.S. 2d 955 
(1996) found the owner/operators to be employees with facts similar to Byrne and 
Western Ports Transportation. See also, K&D Auto Body, Inc. v. Division of 
Employment Security, 171 S. W. 3d 100 (2005). 
Other courts have found owner/operators to be independent contractors and have 
not seized upon MC/DOT authority as a determinative factor. Appellant argues that a 
case cited by the Commission, A1erick Trucking Co. v. Missouri Department of Labor 
and Industrial Relations, 933 S.W.2d 938 (1996), is nothing like the reiationship between 
Appellant and its drivers. Unlike this case, the putative employer leased its trucks to its 
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drivers and paid many of the costs that Appellant passed on to its drivers. A1erick, 933 
S. W.2d at 941. However, the court in Merick found persuasive the fact that drivers were 
entirely dependent on Merick's favor because it held the federal Interstate Commerce 
Commission permit. Id. The Court noted in affirming the Commission below, that the 
Commission "understood the economic reality that the drivers were dependent on 
Merick. Merick, 933 S.W.2d at 942. Although Merick paid for some of its driver's 
expenses, its drivers could never have been independently established. "Merick handled 
the billings, Merick could terminate the relationship at any time, and there was no 
evidence that the drivers ever drove for another trucking firm." Aferick, 933 S.W.2d at 
941. 
Here as in Merick, Appellant's drivers were entirely dependent on Appellant's 
MC/DOT authority. Appellant handled the billing and the drivers had virtually no 
financial risk. Appellant prevented its drivers from going "willy nilly out and haul[ing] 
someone else's product without our [Appellant's] freight bill and our papers .... " Tr. p. 
275, LL 11-25; p. 276, LI. 1-6. As in these cases, this Court in Giltner found the 
MC/DOT authority to be distinctive and a driver's use of a third party's MC/DOT 
authority for the interstate transportation of goods clearly means that that driver was not 
and could not be independently established in the driver's own interstate transportation 
business. 
In Giltner, this Court specifically contrasted Hernandez v. Triple Ell Transport, 
Inc., 145 Idaho 37, 175 P.3d 199 (2007). This Court noted that Hernandez had his own 
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MC/DOT authority and the putative employer was merely his only client. Hernandez 
could at any time have terminated his agreement and gone elsewhere to haul loads in 
interstate commerce using his own MC/DOT authority. Giltner, 145 Idaho at 420, 179 
P .3d at l 076. Also distinguishable for this same reason is Hammond v. Department of 
Employment, 94 Idaho 66, 480 P.2d 912 (1971). Like Mr. Hernandez, the drivers in 
Hammond did not drive under the putative employer's MC/DOT authority. The case of 
National Trailer Convoy, Inc. v. Employment Security Agency of Idaho, 83 Idaho 247, 
360 P.2d 994 (1961), can also be distinguished because at the time this Court issued its 
ruling in National Trailer, the test to determine an independent contractor's exemption 
from covered employment did not require that workers be independently established in 
their own business. Instead, National Trailer was decided using the common law test. 
Further, the statutory employee status of owner/operator drivers is well 
established. For purposes of preventing motor carriers from evading responsibility for 
accidents caused by its owner/operator drivers, courts have found owner/operators to be 
the statutory employees of the business entity legally responsible for complying with the 
DOT regulations governing the use of the driver's vehicles. Zamalloa v. Hart, 31 F. 3d 
911 (91h Cir. 1994). 
The record m this case establishes that Appellant's interstate transportation 
drivers drove under Appellant's MC/DOT authority. Tr. p. 87, LL 14-22; p. 193, LL 9-
19; p. 259, LL 14-16. Consequently, it was legally impossible for Appellant's drivers to 
be independently established in their own interstate transportation business. Therefore, 
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the Commission's decision that Appellant's interstate transportation drivers were 
Appellant's employees for purposes of Idaho's Employment Security Law should be 
affirmed. 
Appellant's simple assertion that this Court should reconsider its prior ruling 
ignores the principle of stare decisis. Recognizing that our judicial system needs to 
respect the rule of law and provide predictability and continuity over time, this Court has 
stated that having previously decided an issue, with no new basis upon which to 
reconsider the issue, it would be guided by the principle of stare dee is is and adhere to the 
law as already expressed by the Court. State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 388, 871 P.2d 
801, 805 (1994). Appellant has not provided any argument to show that Giltner was 
manifestly vvrrong, unwise, or unjust or that overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, 
obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice. Appellant has simply shown 
that the law is inconvenient and does not fit within its style of conducting its interstate 
transportation business. 
II. 
There is substantial and competent evidence in the record to support the 
Industrial Commission's findings and conclusions that the drivers were as 
a matter oflaw employees and not independent contractors as held in 
Giltner, Inc. v. Idaho Department of Commerce and Labor. 
The Idaho Legislature, finding economic insecurity due to unemployment a 
serious threat to the well-being of Idahoans, enacted Idaho's Employment Security Law 
to encourage employers to offer stable employment and to pay benefits during periods of 
unemployment. Idaho Code § 72-1302. This Court has held that Idaho's Employment 
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Security Law should be construed liberally to effectuate that purpose. Davenport v. 
State, Department of Employment, 103 Idaho 492, 494, 650 P.2d 634, 636 (1982). 
Under Idaho's Employment Security Law, "covered employers" are required to 
pay contributions to the employment security fund based on wages paid employees for 
services rendered in "covered employment." King v. Department of Employment, 110 
Idaho 312, 313, 715 P.2d 983 (1986). The law imposes an obligation on employers to 
report wages paid for "covered employment" and to pay unemployment insurance taxes 
based upon the reported payroll. 
The law defines "covered employment" as "an individual's entire service 
performed by him for wages or under any contract of hire, written or oral, express or 
implied." Idaho Code § 72-1316. Idaho Code § 72-1328 defines wages as "all 
remuneration for personal services from whatever source, including commissions and 
bonuses and the cash value of all remuneration in any medium other than cash." It is 
undisputed that Appellant paid its owner/operator driver a percentage of the loads they 
hauled. Tr. p. 75, LI. 21-25. By definition, this remuneration constitutes "wages" paid to 
the drivers. 
In Software Associates, Inc. v. State of Idaho, Department of Employment, 110 
Idaho 315, 715 P.2d 985 (1986), the Supreme Court explained that "the term 'covered 
employment' as used in the Employment Security Act is an expansive term, 'sweeping 
within its purview employees and independent contractors alike." Id. at 316, 715 P .2d at 
986, (citing King v. Dept. of Employment, 110 Idaho 312, 715 P.2d 982 (1986)). To 
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escape from this broad, expansive net of "covered employment," a putative employer 
must "exempt out" of covered employment by demonstrating that it qualifies for the 
statutory exemption for independent contractors. Id. In Software Associates, the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed that the statutory exemption for independent contractors is "to 
be narrowly construed." Id. (emphasis added); see also Branchjlower v. Department of 
Employn1ent, 128 Idaho 593, 597, 947 P.2d 750, 754 (1996) ("[W]hen the Court 
construes taxing statutes and most remedial legislation, exemptions from coverage should 
be narrowly construed.") 
To that end, Idaho Code§ 72-1316(4) presumes wages are received for services in 
covered employment unless the employer proves: 
(a) That the worker has been and will continue to be free from control 
or direction in the performance of his work, both under his contract 
of service, and in fact; and, 
(b) That the worker is engaged in an independently established trade, 
occupation, profession or business. 
(Emphasis added). 
Idaho Code § 72-13 61 provides that the party appealing a determination of 
coverage has the burden of "proving each issue appealed by clear and convincing 
evidence." An employer must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the services 
provided by its workers satisfy both Idaho Code §§ 1316(4)(a) and 72-1316(4)(b) to 
demonstrate the services do not constitute "covered employment." See IDAPA Rule 
09.0L35.112.05 (A worker who meets one but not both of the tests shall be found to 
perform services in covered employment.) 
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There is substantial and competent evidence in the record to support the finding of 
the Industrial Commission that Appellant did not demonstrate by clear and convincing 
evidence that its owner/operator drivers were engaged in an independently established 
trade, occupation, profession or business. Appellant's drivers drove under Appellant's 
MC/DOT authority. Without the drivers' ovvn MC/DOT authority, they could not 
independently operate their own interstate transportation business. One of Appellant's 
drivers admitted that he could not afford to be totally independent and that he did not 
have the contacts to do so. Tr. p. 193, LL 24-25; p. 194, LL 1-4. The only way for 
Appellant's drivers to survive economically was to work under Appellanfs MC/DOT 
authority or the MC/DOT authority of someone else. Tr. p. 263, LL 3-5. There is no 
evidence in the record that Appellant's drivers worked for anyone else. Appellant was 
the sole facilitator for its driver's economic survival. Tr. p. 262, L 21. Without their 
ovv11 MC/DOT authority, none of Appellant's owner/operator drivers were, or could have 
been, independently established in their own interstate transportation business. 
The Commission was bound to follow this Court's decision in Giltner as a matter 
of law. While compliance with federal regulations does not demonstrate control, without 
the statutory authority to work independently, a worker cannot be engaged in an 
independently established trade, occupation, profession or business. The Commission's 
decision to follow this Court's ruling in Giltner was supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. The Commission noted that this Court is not alone in its 
determination that DOT authority is a linchpin in commercial transportation cases 
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involving the assessment of the covered employment relationship. This Court's ruling in 
Giltner is binding on the Commission as a matter of law. 
III. 
The Idaho Department of Labor is entitled to attorney foes and costs on 
appeal. 
Attorney fees on appeal are appropriate, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41 (a) 
and Idaho Code § 12-117. Appellant has provided no substantive evidence Giltner was 
manifestly wrong, unwise, or unjust or that overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, 
obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice, therefore, the Department 
should be entitled to attorney fees in this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no evidence that Giltner was manifestly wrong, unwise, or unjust or that 
overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy 
continued injustice. There is substantial and competent evidence in the record to support 
the Industrial Commission's findings and conclusions that the drivers operating under 
Appellant's MC/DOT authority were by operation of law employees. The Department 
asks the Court to affirm the Commission's decision. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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